THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION FROM THE MEANING OF FOREIGNERS

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ABSTRAC

The immigrant experience is contradictory: on the one hand, it is exposed to discriminatory treatment, to vulnerability- in short, it is *rejected*. On the other hand, there are a number of international treaties that call for non‑discriminatory treatment and a minimum of inalienable rights, trying to *take care* of their human condition. This paper aims to find the philosophical basis of the condition of the migrant, which we have called *the experience of rejection-care*. To respond to this problem, we proceed in a hermeneutical manner, supporting the etymological and historical analysis, and finally present the representative authors of the phenomenology such as Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas and Waldenfels. Although the response by the dual experience of the migrant (rejection-care) is our immediate objective, we believe that our results can be considered as contributions to the development of a *philosophical anthropology of the migrant*.

Keywords: *Migrant, foreigner , xenia, hostis, rejection-care experience, phenomenology.*

Love ye, therefore, the stranger;
for you were strangers
in the land of Egypt.
Deuteronomy 10:19.

Currently, the phenomenon of migration has taken great relevance at all levels: social, economic, political, and cultural. It is a field that is being explored with great effort from the academy. It is a central theme in academic events and publications in the social sciences and currently occupies an undisputed place in the academic bodies of universities and research centers.

Human sciences also deal with this phenomenon, although with less emphasis, perhaps because the social impact of migration urges practical solutions and the work of the humanities does not always go that direction. Just for this instrumental treatment which dominates the issue of migration, it the reason why some have identified the need to return to the basic discussion of ideas to generate less ossified conceptual and theoretical transformations that are at the height of the times and changes in migration and its subjects. This is why Bonilla (2007, p. 27) states that: "The current state of migration studies often shows signs of an epistemological and methodological profound crisis; to this the almost total absence of philosophical production on the topic is added". The work that follows is exploring the philosophical path, starting from a hermeneutical - phenomenological treatment, supporting the contributions of Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas and Waldenfels.[1]

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1 Bonilla (2007) has investigated the development of a nacent philosophy of migration that is based on the work of Lévinas, Derrida, Habermas, Taylor, Ricoeur, Kymlicka, Zambrano, and Waldenfels, who are among the most notable. In an indirect manner, the contributions of Husserl, Heidegger and Ponty, have intervened in this approach to the philosophy of migration. Specifically, the phenomenology of the stranger of Waldenfels supports the work of the aforementioned authors. As so far as it can be appreciated, the phenomenology has been an important contribution to the theme of migration.

This treatment of the subject, as part of the assumption, that behind the social, political, cultural implications, among others that are empirically evident, there are profound anthropological and philosophical questions that may give other interpretations to migration. At the same time it is considered that this way of interpretation of the phenomenon of migration and of the migrant can reveal the ontological character of the human condition.

Which brings us to this philosophical foray which emerges from the contradictory status of the migrant. We refer to the experience of *rejection-care.* That is, being a migrant means, in an essential way, marginalization, exploitation, "garbagization" and undervaluation. All these processes are shades of what we recognize as ontological *rejection.* Empirically, *rejection* has been expressed, for example, in the massacre of San Fernando, Tamaulipas, where organized crime exposed 72 bodies of migrants to the weather, 58 men and 14 women, in 2010 (Mancillas Lopez, 2015, p . 9). The *rejection* to which we refer to is expressed in the condition of labor over-exploitation suffered by the migrant, which is not from a certain context but occurs in general: " It is the case of *Gastarbeiter* in Germany, the *lavoro nero* in Italy, the *Chicano* in the United States, the immigrant in Eastern Europe (Polish, Hungarian, Albanian, etc.), in Western Europe, the *dekassegui* in Japan, the Bolivian (among other Latin Americans) and the African in Brazil "(Antunes, 2014, p. 23).

It's the same *rejection* that Basso expresses to describe the condition of migrants in Europe, which we broadly reproduce given the value of the testimony:

> *In Europe, the whole existence of immigrants and their children are marked by* **discrimination**. *There is discrimination at work, access to work, unemployment insurance, retirement, discrimination in access to housing, more expensive rents in more deteriorated homes in degraded areas. Discriminated, in fact, in schools (in Germany there are very few immigrants who arrive to University. In Italy, 42.5 percent of the children of immigrants are behind in their studies). They are*

discriminated in the possibility of maintaining one's family together, especially if they are of Islamic origin, which are discriminated to profess their own religious faith (Antunes, 2014, p. 24).

For its part, the ontological term *care is* manifested, for example, in public policies that revolve around the protection and defense of all migrants. We can precisely cite as an example - that is repeated in other geographies - the "indisputable objectives" in public policies on migration from the Mexican government:

> *Contribute to national development, through proper migration management based on a legal framework to facilitate migration flows* **with respect for human dignity**.
> **Ensure the protection and defense of human rights of migrants**, *as well as their* **physical integrity and patrimony**, *regardless of their nationality and their condition as documented or undocumented in which the three levels of government participates (Lothar & Chaltelt, Peter, 2011, p. 18).*

The care, we are talking about refers to all those behaviors that try to preserve the integrity and human dignity of migrants. It is protection, hospitality, care, custody, assistnance, among others. All of these are manifestations of what we call ontological *care*.

Thus, the migrant is subject to marginalization, which is synonymous with cheap labor, vandalism, prostitution, etc., and at the same time it is intended to assess its human condition, the ultimate expression of their existence. This condition of migration constitutes the *rejection-care experience* that we have already defined and exemplified above. The question that interests us is to find out how this double meaning arises, and how to explain it . We can say that it is kept (cared for) both because it is simply a vulnerable subject. This response, which is obvious and naive, opens up at least two situations: the first is the vulnerable status of the migrant, i.e., being a migrant means in itself being marginalized and

vulnerable? Is marginalization essential to migration? On the other hand, why you should the condition of vulnerability be imported? Who should import the vulnerability of migrants and why? That is to say, why meet the condition of vulnerability? Is it a matter of sociability? It is that instinctive or biological issue to defend the similar? Put another way: is it the instinct to care for the species which leads us to protect others? Or, is it politics? Is it because of civility? Is there an answer to this that can be corroborated?

The simple question that we have discussed, as we can see, leads to deeper issues and problems. Now, the question of "dual status of the migrant" involves, as a first methodological step, the question of the identity of the migrant. This is the task that will occupy us in the following section.

MIGRANT

Evidently, we know that migration and migrants have specific characteristics depending on location, policy, history and so on . However, the method of asking in philosophy does not go in this direction but, rather, in a general sense. That is, when asked by the migrant and migration *we do not* ask the question from a certain place, we do not ask: what does being a migrant from this or that place signify? Instead, we ask: what does it mean, in general, to be a migrant?

From an etymological point of view, migration is derived from Latin *migratio*: more or less permanent shift of residence; *migratio* is derived from *emigrare* which *means go out of their village* (Corominas, 2008, 371 p.). This etymological sense is the current reference used in social studies. Bonilla (. 2007, p 28) also believes that this is most commonly shared use:

> *Starting from a definition of the term 'migration' among social scientists, I understand it as the residential displacement of a population from one sociospacial area to another (the areas where humans reproduce,*

and produce and exchange material and symbolic elements necessary for the satisfaction of their vital needs and concerns).

This definition is fully operational, because through it you can study migration from a statistical approach: what are the emigration and *im*migration rates? How many immigrants and emigrants are there?....which is necessary to investigate the state of the phenomenon with political, social, economic, demographic, etc. purposes, which serve for the decision-making process . This definition is also behind investigations questioning the causes and effects of own internal and external displacement of migration: unemployment, poverty, marginalization, violence, including traditional associations.

While this approach is useful in a practical sense, it does not help us answer our question: From what horizon of meaning can we understand the migrant rejection-care condition? The traditional definition of migration and migrant does not go in that direction. But then what other definition of migration and migrant exists that can be a hermeneutical way to answer our questions? The truth is that there is no other definition of such phenomena, therefore we must momentarily step away from it and find another path.

Examining the exposed definition we realize that the nuclear point of migration is displacement, which means moving from one place to another. This phenomenon of spatial mobility is what produces, so to speak, migrant status. But the migrant condition, although it is displacement, is not simply a physical move, but essentially is a *being-outside of their place of origin*. This is because the migrant condition is also *inhabited-* outside the place of origin. So we can say that migration is mobility, but remains in the "inhabit"; both, "mobility" and "inhabit" refer to the "place of origin"- moving out of the place of origin, living outside the place of origin. The *displacement of migration comes from the sense of moving and being in a foreign place.*

The foreign, meanwhile, is something that is not itself, which goes beyond oneself. In Latin, what comes from outside, which is alien, was known by the term *extraneus*, which translated into Spanish as *foreign. Extraneus* consists of the prefix *extra and suffix aneus. Extra* means made *outside, containing from the outside, apparently containing of being from outside*; meanwhile, the suffix *aneus* is lengthening of *eus* denoting a composition of materials: *made of, contains or it appears* (Corominas, 2008, 242 p.). Strange, *extraneare* means *made outside, contains the external, it appears to contain or be outside.* When we meet someone who comes from another place we use a word that is closely linked to the strange, we say that person is a foreigner (*extranjero*) . With him, coming from outside, you have a relationship from beyond the usual for their rarity and unfamiliar condition, i.e. the foreign is strange.

Now, in an either factual or customary manner, the same sense of strangeness entails a practical relationship of distrust, care, suspicion, containment or surprise. But what happens when "this" strange thing is another human being? Here a tense before this phenomenon of complex reality occurs: on the one hand, it comes from outside, It is not familiar, it is alien to me; yet "this" strange thing is another human being: It is like me! That which lies before me is strange because I cannot identify my customs, yet is radically family, because he shares with me my humanity. Is not this strange-like condition, which is located in the same experience of meeting with *the foreign*, comprises the foundation of the double meaning of the migrant experience: rejection-care?

From this tension it seems to be that the experience of the *foreign* is closest to our hermeneutical-philosophical work on the proposed problem. We will unreservedly take the pathway of the foreigner to study the effect of the double experience of migrants (rejection-care). This would not move us away from the "migrant", because in any case the migrant and the foreigner are two ways to interpret the physical displacement which arises from both

conditions. However, the migrant and foreigner are simply not synonymous, they are two ways of calling the same thing; They are interpreted as two different interpretive horizons of a single phenomenon. In this sense, the category of the foreigner has a conceptual closeness that makes their interaction possible. In that sense, the category of the foreign, we believe, can help us find new elements to understand the experience of migration and migrants.

At this point we should outline basic questions: our goal is to give a reasoned hypothesis that responds philosophically about the dual experience of migration: rejection-care. The phenomenon of access has been the migrant; however, the traditional definitions of migration and migrant do not serve us directly by the traditional management that has made these categories framed in more empirical questions, and because our question is rather philosophical-hermeneutical. To seek another path we explored the effect of migration, and from this has emerged a semantic relationship to the term foreign. In this category we find, in a preliminary and speculative way, a path that seems more suited to the nature of our investigation. In the following we will explore the meaning of foreigner from different perspectives to see if from their interpretation we can answer our basic question: the underlying reason for migrant rejection-care.

THE MEANING OF IMMIGRATION ORIGINATING IN GREECE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF ITS MEANING IN ROME

Preliminarily, we can say that migration is when a person moves from their home to another abroad, i.e. stranger, "one who comes from outside". But this "come-from-outside" has a character of grace, "the host, the king, the lord, the power, the nation, the state, the father, etc." (Derrida, 1998, p.21)- forced to speak a language that is not his. In that sense, the first violence that the foreigner

is exposed to is to seek hospitality in a language that is not his. Lacking is not only not speaking the same language, but not having access to the cultural capital of the place from where they come. [2]

But this deficiency was not always synonymous with marginalization against him. In Greece the phenomenon of the foreigner was known abroad as *xenos*, which grouped everything together that was not Greek (Buttini, 2014). In Homeric times *xenon* was subject to the hospitality of the *polis* because of religious anthropomorphism that governed their lives: they believed that the gods were presented as people coming from outside. Zeus, the most important figure in Greek deities, "plays a central role as protector - and guest from abroad, generally from the first Homeric testimony" (Oller, 2013, p. 75). [3]

The stranger in Greece did not always speak the same language, "he is not asked where he comes from or where he goes or who he is or what he does ... the host even offers up his wife for the rest of the solitary wanderer" (Giaccaglia, *et al*, 2012, p. 118). Some sources also believe that this hospitable relationship (*xenia*) had commercial and political reasons (Santiago Alvarez, 2010, 2013, Oller Guzmán, 2013; Piñol Villanueva, 2013; Ginestí Rossel, 2013). From this type of act comes the experience of *Filoxenia*, friendship from hospitality (Chirinos, *2007*).

The act of welcoming the stranger in the house (*Oikos*) and private life evolved into a form of public institution of *póleis* , as Araceli Santiago (2013) realizes in the philological and historical study carried out by the text of Aeschylus, The *Supplicants. The Iliad, The Odyssey and Works and days* are other works that testify to the cultural importance that the *xenia* had (Piñol, 2013). For the Greeks, hospitality was not an afterthought, rather it is an

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2. To know what we are referring to regarding cultural capital, see Bourdieu, 1987

3. Although the role of Zeus was dominant in the xenia, Oller (2013) mentions that there was sufficient evidence that it was Aphrodite that had the protection of foreigners as one of her most ancient functions, and with the passing of time it was taken over for the loving relationship in general.

essential character of the human being. For this reason the Cyclops (representation of men without laws, without rules or under) do not know hospitality, the *xenia* (Chirinos, 2007). Cyclopes, therefore, represent a lower level of freedom, virtue and humanity (*Ibid*; 8).

Another consideration involved in the sense of *xenia*, along with the theological and commercial, is the anthropological:

> *To this we must add another consideration, perhaps more implicit in the Greek world, but which is clearly present: the conviction that human beings and also, though to a lesser extent, the gods, are vulnerable and fragile, and may need some care and some material and body goods to be provided as a duty of justice (Chirinos, 2007, p. 10).* [4]

This vulnerability that man is exposed to by nature and is based on *xenia* constitutes the corporeality. The *xenon* is subject to "do good" in the sense of causing welfare. The type of "care" of this productive act is material; "Doing good also must be understood as producing or manufacturing welfare, so then we are facing a positive assessment of basic, every day, material and corporal, circumstances of human existence" (Chirinos, 2007, p. 10).

It is not necessary to understand this "doing good", an essential sense of *xenia*, as an act of expected remuneration. In other words, one does not do good to expect a type of reward. The *xenia* is an act of one direction, so to speak; it is an obligation rather than a right that is born of the vulnerable state of xenon. Chirinos (2007, p. 15) says that it is "a duty that morally perfects those who exercises it."

The study of *xenia* has led some specialists, such as Chirinos, to track an anthropological sense anchored in the idea of humans as lacking and incomplete beings. The answer to this anthropological conception of ancient Greece that remains in the classical

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4. Later we retake this anthropology, when we analyze migration in its actual sense

(with some present contradictions, such as domestic slavery) is the *xenia*: the "doing good", produces wellbeing in the pilgrim, the strange or stranger, *xenon*.

Something very similar has been traced back to the Celts who developed two forms of hospitality (Kortanje, 2012, p.15):

> *The first is linked to receiving a pilgrim and accept him as an envoy of the gods. It was understood that the traveler should be assisted and hosted since this act stemmed from a divine mandate; the root of this ritual was purely religious. By contrast, the second meaning was purely legal and could only be agreed by agreement between the parties. In this case, the hospice represented and ensured the political balance of the Celtic peoples and through these agreements a nonaggression pact between them.*

However, in Rome there was already a rupture from the sense of xenia and *xenon*. This change of direction is with the Latin word *hostis,* guest or host. This first historical sense of *hostis*, gives meaning to our words of accommodation, hospitality, hospice. The foreigner is not inferior or superior person, the *hostes* has the same rights as the Romans and a relationship of equals (Chirinos, 2007) was established. We can interpret that, relatively speaking, the Greek *Filoxenia* remains in practice. But the historical changes of Rome were leading to a totally different experience; that experience is known by the word of hostility. Being a guest, the *hostis* becomes a threatening person, *hostile*, unwanted, viewed with suspicion, which will have to be monitored, conditioned and controlled. That is, both hospitality and hostility share the same root: *hostis- which* came to mean both friend and foe. "The most widely accepted explanation is make them arise from a common meaning: the strange person. The positive expression of strange - strange good — will become the guest; the negative - the bad strange - as an enemy "(Chirinos, 2007, p . 5).

Benveniste explains, beyond the etymological, that the reasons that led to this ambivalent meaning has to do with the violent and expansionist policy of the Roman Empire. From this process comes a more rigorous sense of self and others, i.e., the *civitas* and *barbaric*:

> *From the Roman Empire the word **hostis** and the custom of hospitality began to lose its strength because it presupposed a relationship that is no longer compatible with political developments. Specifically, when ancient societies began to form nations, relations between people and between clans were to weaken. **Civitas** persisted and for her, the condition of being outside or inside. Thus , for a development we do not know exactly, the word **hostis** assumed the sense of hostile and since then began being applied to enemies "(Chirinos, 2007, p.5).*

Migration is not a phenomenon unique to our times. Since its inception , humanity moved for vital purposes (Sutcliffe, 1998) and much evidence shows that the negative sense of the migrant, in the history of the West, intensified when Rome established as a major violent political and military expansion, conquest, an event that intervened for the *hostis – hospitality* became *hostis-hostility.* With this event, the experience of Ancient Greece, xenia, decomposes into two antagonistic phenomena. From that moment, the appearance of a late sense of *hostis* (foreigner-hostile), the old idea of *being a citizen of the world* of the Stoics is forgotten, a narrative resource that has now been recovered (Cf: Cattafi, 2014). Likewise, the anthropological emphasis of foreign vulnerability disappeared, which was the compression of the background of xenia and is supplanted by a sense of the hostile, the enemy.

THE HUMAN THAT UNDERLIES THE CHANGE IN THE MEANING OF GUEST TO ENEMY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP OF REJECTION-CARE

Recalling the examples presented above regarding the status of migrants and the example on public policies towards migrant rights, we ask again: how to understand that the *hostis* while it is treated as external, dangerous to or simply lacking good manners, are the subject of international policies that seek to remedy these living conditions that are understood as vulnerable ? Why at the same time they are vulnerable we exclude them from policies and international agreements? Why this "double standard"?

We do not consider that the change of direction from *host* to *threat* has been produced because of the emergence of an imperialist policy in Rome as we discussed, and this is the underlying cause of the double experience *threat-care.* We believe that the underlying reason of this semantic and factual change is because of deep anthropological issues. That is the underlying reason we believe it is the experience of *strangeness* and *otherness* as an anthropological condition in which forms of social, imaginary, political relationships that are only ways in which such a condition is expressed are based: the experience of strangeness. That is, "there is something" in the essence of the human being which allowed the semantic and factual change in the relationship with foreign and migrant. Arnaiz has spoken in the same sense: "The issue of immigration is an occasion to have to rethink the margins and limits of a human condition linked to universal and unconditioned characteristics" (Arnaiz, 1998, p.121). Waldenfels (1998) has expressed the same sense: the foreigner is an issue that goes beyond foreign policy.

The experience that presents the encounter with the foreign falls within an area of experience that is more original than the enactment of laws, and has to do with the essence of being human: " It all starts with the fact that there is a being that departs

from *itself,* it exceeds *itself,* overflows *itself* and therefore discovers otherness (*Andersheit*), also of animals, of *itself* and the strangeness (*Fremdheit*) of other cultures than their own" (Waldenfels, 2005, p. 43).

Waldenfels conducting a study of the experience of the strange and lays the groundwork for a possible phenomenology of the foreign. Waldenfels refers to the experience of strangeness in his first area of its appearance: world-of-life. In his later work , Husserl, better known as *La krisis*, the philosopher uses the term life-world (*Lebenswelt*), designating the level of everyday life, primitive "space" where the "I" that I am in each case. It is the area where I appropriate "reality" immediately from a pragmatic perspective (Husserl, 2008).

In particular, I understand that in this world of the familiar, life gives me at different levels. The first in being familiar with is to me, myself, my factual being and being in the world ways, my ways to understand and relate to reality. The familiar first is my "style" to be myself. The next is given from the environment. Within the environment I find familiar things and other selves; selves and things which I have established a relationship of closeness and, therefore, have assimilated as part of my everyday life, my world. Those other "I" I find have their own chains of experiences, which, perhaps, may not match with mine and therefore exceed my world of life. The inter subjectivity exposes my limits. This limitation coincides with the finiteness of my own *incarnate possibilities.* [5]

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5. Edmund Husser, for several lectures, has been represented as a philosopher of conscience, inheritor of Cartesian philosophy. However, the theme of the body appears in a significant manner in an active role in the acts of conscience and is not filling a "container". In this sense, Xavier Escribano (2011, p.88) tells us " As it is well known, the systematic analysis of the experience of corporality entered philosophy in the XX century through the hand of Husserl, who carefully distinguished the double way in that the body is made for conscience: on one side, the body (Körper) as a material thing that, from its special characteristics, participates in the qualities of extension, color, etc., of its own other material realities; and on the other hand, the body (Leib) as has been internally experienced, that is, the completely original living experience that we have of the body as a field of localization of the senses, as an organ of will and carrier of free movement, and as the means through with the subject experiences the outside world".

It is from this finitude from where the possibility of an encounter with the strange is possible. The strange does not break the from the everyday, but the sense of ones own experience of the everyday and habitual "belonging, reliability, availability" (Waldenfels, 2011, p.122). In Husserl this break is exceeded when the ego assimilates otherness (*cfr*: Waldenfels, 2011, p.123). The strangeness, from Husserl 's position (in consideration of Waldenfels) is a deficit of consciousness that tends to level off. In fact, from the very moment that the sense of "strangeness" appears in the intentional act, a consciousness is referring to it in an assimilating way. The strangeness is thus a conquest of ego, omnipotent and founding. The otherness is yoked to the ego by its founding power and thus "lost" to the same otherness.

Although with Husserl we can penetrate to the original place where the "strangeness" is based, it is with Heidegger that we can know the meaning with which the strange and foreign is presented, that from the analysis of the tempers of the mind that he makes.

In the existential analytic of the Dasein developed in *Being and Time* (2009), Heidegger analyzes the constitution of the original place where existence unfolds, that place is the *there*: "This being carries its own being the character of not-being-closed. The expression That lies about this essential openness. Through it, this entity (*Dasein*) is the 'there' for himself to the living-being-there of the world "(Heidegger, 2009, p.153). This openness occurs in *affective* disposition and the *original understanding*. The affective disposition is the existential explaining that Dasein finds tempered in the world, that is, always be willing in an affective manner. The world, then, appears in moods while at the same time is existentially to the being of the *Dasein* in its capacity as cast away (*Cf.* Heidegger, 2009, pp.153-59).

As exemplification of the affective disposition, Heidegger makes a phenomenological examination of fear: "Fear as an affective disposition." This analysis aims to expose not only the structure of the temple of "fear" but that, through the analysis of this

temple "comes to light the structure of the affective disposition in general" (Heidegger, 2009, p.159).

For our work, the analysis of fear is enlightening. Fear has a "to-do" which is that of which the fear of fear, the "object of fear", so to speak. That which appears, which can be any useful or another *Dasein* , has the nature of *threat* . In other words, fear fears what threatens the *Dasein* and appears in the respective conditional as detrimental: the compression of my own existence is threatened because within a state of affairs it can be harmful. This harmful, insofar as it tends to be approached, is experienced as disturbing, it disturbs the stillness, familiarity. We come up to here with the analysis of fear in Heidegger and return to our main theme: the migrant.

The analysis of fear by Heidegger points to the central characters of experience with foreigners / migrants: the migrant, while abroad, is something that comes from outside, it is something *strange.* As a stranger it does not belong to the realm of the familiar, it breaks with the constitutive familiarity of "normality". In this "comes from outside", it becomes disturbing and its proximity takes on the character of threatening, as it may prove harmful. In this experience, the *Dasein* is willing psychically from fear, he is afraid. The rejection suffered by the migrant, the stranger, is the form of dealing with fear. The foreigner is something that can prove to be harmful, threatening me or mine, so I fear and finally reject it, although it can also control, monitor, exploit, and kill, among other relationships that I establish with him. Border policies are institutional developments that have deployed the possibilities of this experience that was originally generated from the everyday and they find their reason to be in the consistency of human beings in terms of *Dasein* , being-in-the-world (*In-der- Welt-Sein*), open soul-compressively .

Finally we can say the following: if we take as a basis the phenomenological analysis of the tempers of mind that Heidegger makes, where fear comes as a break of stillness and familiarity,

we realize that the presence of the foreign is based on the threat aroused by their strangeness: his condition come from outside. This threat is not real, but felt as mere possibility that it becomes harmful. This is the understanding of the foreigner's background and experience that awakens the soul.

THE BODY AS ESTABLISHING THE SCOPE
OF THE HUSSERLIAN WORLD-OF-LIFE AND
HEIDEGGERIAN THERE

But "where" does fear arise? Both the *world-of-life* of Husserl and *there* of Heidegger presuppose a body. Waldenfels refers to this original field of the "I" as the *"here"*. In this sense, identity becomes a phenomenology of moles and body. The I self-refers from a spatial experience: I'm here. This *here*, is not the *there* of Heidegger that only appoints the state of openness of *Dasein*. The here is a busy place from the body, it is where I am and I am I. This place is a physical guiding principle, which makes sense since one right and one left, down and up, one in front and behind. But at the same time our here is a cultural orientation and physical extension and is not an anonymous, undifferentiated place in the infinite space of geometry. On the contrary, this *here* has a story; the space it inhabits is my body and is culturally constituted. The body and *here* are a synthesis of materiality and symbolism.

At the same time the body is presented as the first boundary of the interior and exterior: what I am immediately and what is not and, in that sense, of the self and others: "The delimitation inward begins, again, in your own *body*, with the skin as a superficial contact limit "(Waldenfels, 2004, p. 28). In the contact of my body (which includes both my flesh as well as what I am experientially) with their environment, it extends towards its outer -escaping the limits of the skin and taking its belongings as their own, their homes, their region, their country, taking all as something internal,

something his that identifies him.. How far does the experience go and where does the next begin? Until the geographical boundary where identity is recognized. And when we talk about identity, right there is the body, such as the synthesis of carnality and symbolism that is recognized as self.

Waldenfels accuses the experience of strangeness from the original appropriation of space by the body. This material and symbolic appropriation enables the body what is and is not, at the same time, in its place. Spatially you may be outside of the same, as a migrant, but symbolically you continue in the same site of reference. Somehow his "home" accompanies it. German explains as follows: "If we designate the here body as the place from which parts all motion in our space and as the place in which it is anchored any orientation, then we must add that, as corporeal beings, we must simply never weigh anchors, ever "(Waldenfels, 2004, p. 29).

What interests us from our subject is that the body, from the position of Waldenfels, is the original area where states the self and others, for this is from that dimension where the strange experience lives. If it is so, it is the body located in its physical-experiential space which feels threatened in his carnality and symbolism. Both the world-of-life of Husserl, as the *there* of Heidegger, presuppose the area of the body. [6]

Now, Heidegger opens us to the strange and thereby, the foreigner as an experience of fear, shown in its sense as a threat. What foreign threat? From the analysis of Waldenfels, we can say that fear is born of the body, since this is precisely the scope founder of finitude and human vulnerability. The material-experiential body founded the fearful-being of the *Dasein* .The body fears for his carnality or symbolization, in short, it fears what it is.

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6. In the previous note we clarified that Husserl, from his own philosophical interests, opens the theme of the body with the notion of the lived body. In this same sense, Adrian Escudero (2011) considers that in Heidegger there exists the principals or fundaments of a phenomenon of the body without the same philosophy that has been developed in an explicit manner. It is Ponty that develops this phenomenology with all his creative and original strength, without omitting the debt with his teachers

In a factual or usual way, we act against the threat in very specific ways: distrust, care, suspicion, repression, and containment. All of these ways of relating to the strange share, finally, an urgency: that of assimilation. You can assimilate the experience of strangeness by pushing it away or by integrating it. Each of these forms of assimilation are political forms: pushing away, namely in exile, closing borders or killing them, which is the radical intensification of remoteness. Integrating them, to the extent that it is "part of the landscape", in the voice of Alain Badiu: "Be like me and I'll respect your difference" (2004, p.51). But where is their care? Both distance and integration are forms of rejection of the foreign and its otherness: the distance, from a physical point of view; integration, from a kind of symbolic exorcism that tries to despoil their external ingredients and become more like me. Integration is a way of *rejecting* their difference and thus, their otherness.

If you recall, what becomes complex and contradictory of the migrant, which at the end is a foreigner, is the integration of two opposing ways that make the experience of foreignness and migration. That pair has been formulated as rejection-care. We have given the hand of Husserl, Heidegger and Waldenfels' arguments to understand the origin of rejection, but where does their care come in? To answer this we must go in another direction.

INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AS THE COVERS OF THE LEVINASIAN *FACE*

Levinas makes a comprehensive study of the experience of otherness and humanism. In the *Humanism of the other man* (2009), he mentions that there is a phenomenon that connects us to the other without any mediation: the face. The way the face is presented is through the word, from silence you say "thou shalt not kill". The face speaks ethical sense.

The face in Levinas represents humanity. A humanity that is understood from the face, appears fragile, exposed, threatened, "as inviting us to an act of violence" (Levinas, 1991 in Diez, 1992, p. 23). However, it is this same insecurity which prevents the violent act. The word that the face opens, the meeting, remember, is to not murder. This word is the only way community, knowledge and history exist, so Levinas does not speak in an "ideal" sense (*Cf.* : Ten, 1992).

> *Thou shalt not kill is not as a simple rule of conduct. It appears as the beginning of the speech itself and spiritual life. Since then, language is not only a system of signs in the service of preexisting thought. The spoken word is the order of morality before belonging to the order of the theory (Levinas, 2008, quoted in Ten 1992, p.26).*

Levinas tells us that the face appears naked. This nudity says this is a face and nothing else, no phenomenal content that reaches an intentional act clear in its mystery. Its nudity also says it is "before all culture, which affirms the independence of ethics regarding history" (Ten, 1992, p.24). With the nudity of the face, Levinas locates ethics, understood as the relationship established from the "thou shalt not kill" as independent of the "ethics" of different cultures in which good and evil is a historic and capricious building. Where the killing may well be an act of supposed kindness or "holy cross". So the face leaves no room for interpretation, first, because it is not phenomenon and in that sense "disarms intentionality of what it says" (Ten, 1992, p.25); secondly, by their nakedness and insecurity: "The face is meaning without context. I mean, the other is not a character in a context "(Levinas, 1954, quoted in Diez, 1992, p.23).

The sense of human beings, their vulnerable condition, thought from the face, do not give excuses or reasons for their death, although these excuses or reasons come from the culture of knowledge or any other field. "Thou shalt not kill" is a *conditio*

sine qua non of humanity. This means, in turn, that humanism is set to the other.

However, that the face disarms all intentionality does not mean that the I does not try to integrate through his volitional acts. When the Self is returned to another to know and represent, it makes the human face as a subject or an object. Just when you look at the color of eyes, skin, sex or what the other carries in his hands, whether he has lost the ethical relationship, since what is behind the "recognition" is an instrumental act. When the ethical relationship becomes instrumental the face suffers a covering that conceals his nakedness and power: thou shalt not kill.

Levinas tries to find a new beginning beyond the ontological, which he sees as the way of knowledge of power relations, taxation and violence, since all otherness is subsumed into being. Ontology "hates" the other; from it all it is to be. In that sense the other disappears into anonymity and becomes a Cartesian subject, pure *cogito* , without narrative identity, i.e. without biography or life story. The other loses his time and living spaces that constitute it as what it is: its identity, in a word, loses his humanity. In this conversion, which is changing its ethics to its ontological constitution, it becomes subject —even object- to integration, domination and annihilation. The new beginning beyond ontology and being is the beginning of ethics as a first philosophy, where the other is another and nothing else, where their humanity is sheltered behind his face, that is, in its mystery. However – distancing ourselves from Levinas- the face is sullied and factual. This act of defiling can be violent through the skinning[7] or covering by certain rationality.

The face in Levinas is a reflection of humanity; thus it contains the face of humanity, which always occurs in face - to - face. This

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7.The skinning of a face is not only an act of physical torture, but at the same time is a symbolic act: it is the removal of humanity. The skinning of the face of Julio Cesar Mondragon in Iguala is a warning in a time without humanity in a mere period of civility, modernization, human rights, etc. It is rather a period of nihility. Everything disappears in time, the nation state, ethics, face to face relationships, the truths disappear and everything loses consistency. Nietzche said nihilism, Husserl the forgotten world of life, Heidegger the forgetting of being, Levinas the forgetting of ethics; while in the narco culture and the growing violence as well as the disappearances by criminals or the state.

face says the philosopher, "is presented in its nakedness, not in a hidden way ... not a phenomenon that hides" (Levinas, 2009, p.73). But where the face is the ethical that challenges the exploitation of the laborer, when one plays the other as its capital, as property, as a generator of surplus value, as cheap labor, etc. Don't indigenous women and men who cross the border from Guatemala to be exploited on coffee farms have faces? Don't Central American women who are left to trade only their love because they aren't given other work have faces? Don't children working all day shining shoes and selling gum, have faces? Doesn't the migrant-foreigner have a face when they become *hostile*, the enemy (*hostis*)? And the Jews, the same as Levinas himself, how and when did they lose their face that made the Nazi death camps possible?

Levinas lived the Holocaust in first person, so he knows that the power of the face and the lordship of the other has not stopped genocide, or Auschwitz or America, the latter has been the greatest of all time, "For homicide is actually possible "(Levinas, 2004, p.27). The bottom line is that the nudity of the face, while it puts it beyond history and culture, enables it coating. Western history has been forged from the history of being, thanks to the thorough analysis of Heidegger we know that the platonic *eidos* has been opened and reaches our days as technoscience, *Gestell* . Western history is the transformation of the Greek techne, as a mode of human action *according* to the *physis*, becoming independent of the *physis* to become operation and performance of the entity (typical of the industrial era) and evolving to the modification of nature (part of the advances in genetic engineering), ending their journey in danger of planetary annihilation.[8] In this story, in which the nuclear issue is the change in the direction of truth and being,

8 The lecture that Heidegger made of western history taken the forgotten history as a path of the being is part nuclear in the stage of its thinking known as the spin (kehre). The ideas about transformation of the Greek techne until modern technology together with a great number of works, seminars or personal documents of Heidegger, among which the following stand out: Letter about humanism, From the essence of truth, and The memory that is internalized in metaphysics. In Nietzche II, the doctrine of Plato comes close to the truth, the age of the image of the world, the question for the technique, Fundamental questions about Philosophy, where maybe the most paradigmatic is Donations to Philosophy.

man strongly developed its instrumental characters (instrumental rationality) to undermine the ethics of openness to otherness. In *Totality and Infinity* (2002, p.67), Levinas posed as follows:

> *Knowing ontologically is to surprise, in being addressed, that for which he is not this body, this stranger, but that for which he is somehow betrayed , given to the horizon that is lost and appears, admits , and becomes concept. Knowing comes from the apprehended being from nothing or take it or nothing, take their otherness.*

The imperial phase of Rome is an important development of this instrumental hubris, so it is no coincidence that at this stage there has concluded the institution of Greek hospitality which came to Rome at an early stage. And it is that only the power of instrumental rationality, expressed as means to an ends, investment-profit, has been able to cover and hide the original nakedness of the face, the nakedness of humanity. Only the instrumental rationality from centuries of enslavement of the human spirit, has been coated and has transformed the ethical call for a possibility and opportunity of exploitation and death.

This coating of the face by instrumental rationality functions as a mask, a coating, which means that the face has more originality than its coating: All masks reveal a face, any mask is possible from a previously existing face. That is, you can only reject that to which it is already open. In this sense the coating is not complete; the face can be seen from the mask that it conceals. That is why while the migrant, while *hostis*, is treated in a marginalized manner, it is also subject to counter-vulnerable politics. It is a tense movement between the instrumental and ethical, between rejection and care, where care and ethics are more original than their peers.

CONCLUSION

Migration is now changing the global landscape. There are major political, social, and geographical concerns, involving discourses about the migrant. However, the exploration and research on the subject has forgotten to rethink the basic questions. It is important to continue to raise questions because migration, like any historical phenomenon, reinvents itself, reconfigures and demands that to the extent, there are new answers.

Migration and foreignness is an opportunity to follow the philosophy of thinking about human nature and also provide new theoretical hypotheses to explain the nature of this phenomenon; explanations that could be legitimized or rejected by the social empirical sciences. In that sense, this exercise reveals that the migrant experience of *rejection-care*, has deep anthropological conditions that have to do with the very essence of being human.

The results listed below may represent *notes preliminaries* of a philosophical anthropology of migrants:

- In the experience *rejection-care* , it is revealed that the most original pair is caring . Rejection can only be possible on something which, from the start, we are already open to. Care is therefore the first experience of our encounter with foreigners. This means that originally man lives from an opening ethic . Therefore you have to reformulate the *rejection-care* experience, for one of care-rejection according to genetic levels.
- However, the original experience of care is modified by *rejection* , in Levinasian terms represents the concealment of the face starting from the colonization of the world-of-life from instrumental rationality and processes of idealization or concomitant in science, which has resulted, among other things, the domination of the logic of the market on ethics . The experience of the migrant / foreigner of

care-rejection is a tense relationship between the ethical and instrumental.

- Compressive animi-sense that is found behind this rejection is the *fear* in Heideggerian terms: the foreigner is presented as a *threat* , as a factor in its closeness may be *harmful* .

- How damaging speaks about my state of being-vulnerable which is constituted by the fragility of being-for-death, *Dasein* , man. It is from this vulnerability that the foreigner can be presented as a threat.

- The experience of foreigners or migrants is in an area of original experience, the encounter with the strange, the foreign. This experience, in turn, is incorporated from the first embodiment as a scope of the *external* and the same.

- The above results should be thought of as ontological expressions of man that manifest in the meeting with the migrant. The border and migration policies are expressions of historical and factual practices of this ontological ambit. That is, the encounter with the foreigner / migrant falls within an area that is deeper than political borders.

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